Showing posts with label Thomas Woods. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Thomas Woods. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 2, 2011

Meltdown by Thomas Woods


Awesome, insightful book by Thomas Woods that explores the role of the federal reserve in the economic crash. What is most important is not if you agree with his conclusions and recommendations, but if you at least explore the questions that he poses. To here a discussion on the book, click on the link:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=541bajR4k8g

Sunday, September 12, 2010

Overview of Nullification

Thomas Woods presents a compelling argument why states are entitled to nullify unjust, unconstitutional federal mandates. I predict that the growing national debt and ideological divide across the land, will lead to one of two paths: an increasingly ugly conflict over the political, economic and cultural direction of the nation or a revitalized, tolerant federalism that respects the rights of states and communities to self governance.


Author's Corner: Tom Woods

Thursday, July 08, 2010

For those unclear on the concept, what is the basic principle of Nullification?


Nullification is Thomas Jefferson’s idea, articulated most clearly in his Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, that if the federal government passes a law that reaches beyond the powers delegated by the states, the states should refuse to enforce it. Jefferson believed that if the federal government is allowed to hold a monopoly on determining what its powers are, we have no right to be surprised when it keeps discovering new ones. If they violate the Constitution, we are “duty bound to resist,” to quote James Madison’s Virginia Resolutions of 1798.


What are some examples of states using nullification and the tenth amendment historically?


Virginia and Kentucky raised the prospect of nullification against legislation in 1798 that made it a crime to criticize the President or Congress. They did so at a time when most judges and most states thought this was just fine and perfectly constitutional. New England states refused to comply with the execution of Jefferson’s embargo. In 1814, Daniel Webster urged the states to resist if military conscription were enacted. On numerous occasions, northern states did their best to obstruct the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, aspects of which they considered unconstitutional notwithstanding the Constitution’s fugitive-slave clause. Wisconsin’s legislature passed a resolution in 1859 defending their inaction, and quoting Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 word for word.

Have states used nullification more recently?


Issues relating to health care, gun ownership, and medical marijuana are perhaps the most obvious, with states either defying or prepared to defy unconstitutional federal interference in these areas. Medical marijuana is a particularly good example, since the Supreme Court ruled against it, the Justice Department is against it, and yet it still goes on. More than a dozen states allow it in direct defiance of the federal will. If the people are determined to resist a law they believe violates the Constitution and are prepared to stand up against it, the federal government may well have to back down – as it did on medical marijuana and on the REAL ID Act of 2005.


What are the historic connections between the ideology of the founding fathers and Nullification?


The War for Independence was fought over the principle of local self-government, so of course it would make no sense for Americans to turn around and establish a strong central government that would trample on local self-government. Indeed they did no such thing.


The Virginia ratifying convention of 1788 is instructive. Skeptics of the Constitution feared that it would produce a government without limits. Supporters of the Constitution assured them that the federal government would possess only those powers “expressly delegated” to it. George Nicholas, who would become the first attorney general of Kentucky, assured Virginians that if the federal government attempted to impose “any supplementary condition” upon them – that is, if it tried exercising a power beyond those expressly delegated to it – then Virginia would be “exonerated” from that measure. With this assurance Virginia barely voted to ratify the Constitution.

How do you feel the federal government is overstepping its bounds?


The federal government has inverted the system bequeathed to us by the Framers of the Constitution, in which a central government whose powers were “few and defined” (to quote James Madison) provided for the common defense of states whose powers were “numerous and indefinite” (to quote Madison again). Absurd interpretations of the general welfare, commerce, and “necessary and proper” clauses have been advanced at the various steps along the path that has taken us here. We have forfeited the one unique feature of American political life, and transformed the U.S. into just another run-of-the-mill centralized state.

What sort of federal laws do you feel should be nullified?


From a strategic point of view, I would begin with laws whose injustice is widely acknowledged. The No Child Left Behind Act is despised by libertarians, traditional conservatives, and the teachers’ unions – a very unusual combination. It is an insult to the American population to imply that they are too stupid to run their own schools according to their own priorities.

Do you feel Nullification is connected to a particular ideology?


It needn’t be. Leftists like Kirkpatrick Sale believe deeply in local self-government, while neoconservatives like Bill Kristol, with their grotesque “national greatness conservatism,” would be appalled by serious assertions of power by the states. California is considering decriminalizing marijuana, which we would more readily associate with the Left than the Right. People on Left and Right worked together in two dozen states to nullify the REAL ID Act of 2005.

It should be obvious that we need the institutional ability to say no to the federal government. According to Richard Fisher of the Dallas Federal Reserve, the U.S. government faces $100 trillion in unfunded entitlement liabilities. The system must unravel at some point. Yet the federal government goes about its oblivious way, taking on ever more obligations and racking up larger and larger deficits. The states may as well get acclimated to fending for themselves, since the day when they will have no choice but to do so cannot be more than a generation away.

Monday, September 6, 2010

Nullification: Interview with a Zombie


A must see interview with the great writer Thomas Woods, discussing his book "Nullification: How to Resist Federal Tyranny in the 21st Century."

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TrcM5exDxcc

Sunday, April 25, 2010

No, the Free Market Did Not Cause the Financial Crisis

Very insightful piece by Thomas Woods. Most people correctly point out that a major factor that brought on the great recession was that financial institutions X, Y & Z pursued paths of excessive risk and malinvestment. When asked what prompted this reckless behavior, many Americans will answer "greed" and "de-regulation." Both are flawed answers, because from Maine to Mumbai, businesses always seek to maximize their profits and static regulation can do little to prevent unwise investments in a market that is constantly evolving and constantly in flux. Mr. Woods goes beneath the surface and asked what forces and what policies prompted so many well established firms to simultaneously pursue unwise investments. I believe that he provides some compelling explanations. You be the judge.

No, the Free Market Did Not Cause the Financial Crisis

by Thomas E. Woods, Jr.

In March 2007 then-Treasury secretary Henry Paulson told Americans that the global economy was “as strong as I’ve seen it in my business career.” “Our financial institutions are strong,” he added in March 2008. “Our investment banks are strong. Our banks are strong. They’re going to be strong for many, many years.” Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke said in May 2007, “We do not expect significant spillovers from the subprime market to the rest of the economy or to the financial system.” In August 2008, Paulson and Bernanke assured the country that other than perhaps $25 billion in bailout money for Fannie and Freddie, the fundamentals of the economy were sound.

Then, all of a sudden, things were so bad that without a $700 billion congressional appropriation, the whole thing would collapse.

In the wake of this change of heart on the part of our leaders, Americans found themselves bombarded with a predictable and relentless refrain: the free market economy has failed. The alleged remedies were equally predictable: more regulation, more government intervention, more spending, more money creation, and more debt. To add insult to injury, the very people who had been responsible for the policies that created the mess were posing as the wise public servants who would show us the way out. And following a now-familiar pattern, government failure would not only be blamed on anyone and everyone but the government itself, but it would also be used to justify additional grants of government power.

The truth of the matter is that intervention in the market, rather than the market economy itself, was the driving factor behind the bust.

F.A. Hayek won the Nobel Prize for his work showing how the central bank’s intervention into the economy gives rise to the boom-bust cycle, making us feel prosperous until we suffer the inevitable crash. Most Americans know nothing about Hayek’s theory (known as the Austrian theory of the business cycle), and are therefore easy prey for the quacks who blame the market for problems caused by the manipulation of money and credit. The artificial booms the Fed provokes, wrote economist Henry Hazlitt decades ago, must end “in a crisis and a slump, and…worse than the slump itself may be the public delusion that the slump has been caused, not by the previous inflation, but by the inherent defects of ‘capitalism.’”

Although my recently released book, Meltdown explains the process in more detail, an abbreviated version of Austrian business cycle theory might run as follows:

Government-established central banks can artificially lower interest rates by increasing the supply of money (and thus the funds banks have available to lend) through the banking system. This is supposed to stimulate the economy. What it actually does is mislead investors into embarking on an investment boom that the artificially low rates seem to validate but that in fact cannot be sustained under existing economic conditions. Investments that would have correctly been assessed as unprofitable are falsely appraised as profitable, and over time the result is the squandering of countless resources in lines of investment that should never have been begun.

If lower interest rates are the result of increased saving by the public, this increase in saved resources provides the material wherewithal to see the additional investment through to completion. The situation is very different when the lower interest rates result from the Fed’s creation of new money out of thin air. In that case, the lower rates do not reflect an increase in the pool of savings from which investors can draw. Fed tinkering, in other words, does not increase the real stuff in the economy. The additional investment that the lower rates encourage therefore leads the economy down a path that is not sustainable in the long run. Investment decisions are made that quantitatively and qualitatively diverge from what the economy can support. The bust must come, no matter how much new money the central bank creates in a vain attempt to stave off the inevitable day of reckoning.

The recession or depression is the necessary, if unfortunate, correction process by which the malinvestments of the boom period, having at last been brought to light, are finally liquidated. The diversion of resources into unsustainable investments out of conformity with consumer desires and resource availability comes to an end, with businesses failing and investment projects abandoned. Although painful for many people, the recession/depression phase of the cycle is not where the damage is done. The bust is the period in which the economy sloughs off the malinvestments and the capital misallocation, re-establishes the structure of production along sustainable lines, and restores itself to health. The damage is done during the boom phase, the period of false prosperity that precedes the bust. It is then that the artificial lowering of interest rates causes the squandering of capital and the initiation of unsustainable investments. It is then that resources that would genuinely have satisfied consumer demand are diverted into projects that make sense only in light of the temporary and artificial conditions of the boom.

Adding fuel to the fire of the most recent boom was the so-called Greenspan put, the unofficial policy of the Greenspan Fed that promised assistance to private firms in the event of risky investments gone bad. The Financial Times described it as the view that “when markets unravel, count on the Federal Reserve and its chairman Alan Greenspan (eventually) to come to the rescue.” According to economist Antony Mueller, “Since Alan Greenspan took office, financial markets in the U.S. have operated under a quasi-official charter, which says that the central bank will protect its major actors from the risk of bankruptcy. Consequently, the reasoning emerged that when you succeed, you will earn high profits and market share, and if you should fail, the authorities will save you anyway.” The Financial Times reported in 2000, in the wake of the dot-com boom, of an increasing concern that the Greenspan put was injecting into the economy “a destructive tendency toward excessively risky investment supported by hopes that the Fed will help if things go bad.”

When things do go bad, pumping more money into the banking system, thereby lowering interest rates once again, only exacerbates the problem, because it encourages the continued wasteful deployment of capital in unsustainable lines that will eventually have to be abandoned anyway, and it forces healthy, wealth-generating firms to have to go on competing with bubble firms for labor and capital. When interest rates are made artificially low, they encourage the kind of investment that would normally occur only if more saved resources existed to fund them than actually do. Continuing to force interest rates down only perpetuates the allocation of capital into outlets that the economy’s current resource base cannot sustain.

In response to the dot-com and NASDAQ collapses and the modest recession that accompanied them in 2000 and 2001, that Alan Greenspan and the Fed chose to embark on a robust policy of inflation, an approach that culminated in lowering the federal funds rate (the rate at which banks lend to each other) to a mere one percent from June 2003 to June 2004. Already by early 2001 the Fed had begun to ease once again. That year saw no fewer than 11 rate cuts. The unsustainable dot-com boom could not, in the end, be reignited, and thank goodness – the resource misallocations in that sector were unhealthy for the economy. But the Fed’s easy money and refusal to allow the recession of 2000 to take its course led to an even more perilous bubble elsewhere. That was the only recession on record in which housing starts did not decline. Not coincidentally, that was also the moment at which people began to conclude that house prices never fall, that a house is the best investment one can make, and so on. By intervening in the market then, the Fed prevented the market from making a full correction, thereby perpetuating unsustainable investment and consumption decisions. In so doing it merely postponed what it was trying to avoid, and made the crash worse when it finally came.

Fiscal stimulus, meanwhile, merely diverts resources from the productive sector in order to fund money-losing enterprises arbitrarily chosen by government. These artificial expenditures, moreover, interfere with the market’s attempt to sort out genuine demand from bubble demand. “Stimulus” spending can in fact keep firms (construction companies, for example) in business that for the sake of genuine economic health need to be liquidated so their resources can be more sensibly employed in more urgently demanded lines of production.

The claim that “stimulus” spending is necessary to bring “idle resources” back into use also misfires, since it fails to consider why so many entrepreneurs – who have survived as long as they have on the market because of their skill at anticipating consumer demand – should suddenly have become, all at once, such poor forecasters that they’re all saddled with idle resources.

The reason for the idle resources is, obviously, some prior act of miscalculation. And what could have created such systemic miscalculation? Could it be the Fed’s artificially low interest rates, that distort entrepreneurial forecasting and encourage the wrong kind of investments at the wrong time?

Consider a restaurant owner who mistakes the temporary demand for his product deriving from the presence of the Olympics in his city with real, sustainable demand. Suppose he opens a new location to accommodate all this new demand. When the Olympics are over, he’s left with idle resources – labor with nothing to do and empty restaurant space for starters. Should we want to “stimulate” these resources back into activity? Of course not. They shouldn’t have been allocated this way in the first place. We should want the market, guided by the price system, to redeploy them into sensible channels.

The problem, therefore, isn’t that we lack enough “spending” or “demand,” and that we need government to fill in the “missing demand.” The problem is that in the wake of Fed-induced misallocations of resources we wind up with structural imbalances, a mismatch between the capital structure and consumer demand. The recession is the period in which the economy repairs this mismatch by reallocating resources into lines of production that actually correspond to consumer demand. The modern preoccupation with levels of spending instead of patterns of spending obscures the most important aspects of the question.

Had the market been allowed to work before the collapse, there would have been no housing bubble and no crisis in the first place. Had the market been allowed to work when the crisis hit, recovery would have been swift – as it was in 1920–21, when an even worse depression came to a rapid end without any open-market operations by the Fed, and without any fiscal stimulus. (In fact, the federal budget was cut in half from 1920 to 1922.)

What, in short, should we do now? Exactly the opposite of what our so-called experts, who in a sane world would be forever discredited, urge upon us.

May 8, 2009

http://www.lewrockwell.com/woods/woods111.html

Tuesday, December 1, 2009

Unnatural Disaster



Thomas E. Woods


Thomas E. Woods puts forth a compelling explanation of economic booms and busts that emphasizes the role of the Federal Reserve's command of interest rate in producing irrational economic activity. After reading his works no one with intellectual honesty can explain our current economic downturn as primarily stemming from the "free market" or "unfettered capitalism."

Unnatural Disaster

How the Fed creates booms and busts

By Thomas E. Woods Jr.

We accept as a fact of economic life that plush times inevitably give way to lean times. Just as the moon waxes and wanes, the economy goes through booms and busts.

Median home price increased by 150 percent from August 1998 to August 2006. Over the next two years, home prices fell by 23 percent. Foreclosures skyrocketed.

The stock market has followed a similar course. When the New York Stock Exchange closed on Oct. 9, 2007, the Dow was 14,164.53, the highest close ever. Thirteen months later, it closed at 7,552.29, a drop of 46.7 percent. Retirement portfolios have been eviscerated. Unemployment has increased. When the figures are compiled the way government calculated them in the 1970s, the unemployment rate in November 2008 was 16.7 percent.

These personal dimensions of busts are used to justify government intervention, whether creating a safety net or drawing up regulations aimed at smoothing out the cycle supposedly inherent in the free market. But is this inevitable? Is the market economy really prone to sudden, inexplicable episodes of massive business error—or could something outside the market be causing it?

If politicians are honest in seeking a culprit, they will find that it’s not capitalism. It’s not greed. It’s not deregulation. It’s an institution created by government itself.

No one is surprised when a business has to close. Entrepreneurs may have miscalculated costs of production, failed to anticipate patterns of consumer tastes, or underestimated resources necessary to comply with ever-changing government regulation. But when many businesses have to close at once, that should surprise us. The market gradually weeds out those who do a poor job as stewards of capital and forecasters of demand. So why should businessmen, even those who have passed the market test year after year, suddenly all make the same kind of error?

Economist Lionel Robbins argued that this “cluster of errors” demanded an explanation: “Why should the leaders of business in the various industries producing producers’ goods make errors of judgment at the same time and in the same direction?” We call this pattern of apparent prosperity followed by general depression the business cycle, the trade cycle, or the boom-bust cycle. Does it have a cause, or is it, as Marx argued, an inherent feature of the market economy?

F.A. Hayek won the Nobel Prize in economics for a theory of the business cycle that holds great explanatory power—especially in light of the current financial crisis, which so many economists have been at a loss to explain. Hayek’s work, which builds on a theory developed by Ludwig von Mises, finds the root of the boom-bust cycle in the central bank—in our case the Federal Reserve System, the very institution that postures as the protector of the economy and the source of relief from business cycles.

Looking at the money supply makes sense when searching for the root of an economy-wide problem, for money is the one thing present in all corners of the market, as Robbins pointed out in his 1934 book, The Great Depression. “Is it not probable,” he asked, “that disturbances affecting many lines of industry at once will be found to have monetary causes?”

In particular, the culprit turns out to be the central bank’s interference with interest rates. Interest rates are like a price. Lending capital is a good, and you pay a price to borrow it. When you put money in a savings account or buy a bond, you are the lender, and the interest rate you earn is the price you are paid for your money.

As with all goods, the supply and demand for lending capital determines the price. If more families are saving or more banks are lending, borrowers don’t have to pay as much to borrow, and interest rates go down. If there’s a rush to borrow or a dearth of lending capital, interest rates go up.

There are some results of this dynamic that contribute to a healthy economy. Start with the case where people are saving more, thus increasing the supply of lending capital and lowering interest rates. Businesses respond by engaging in projects aimed at increasing their productive capacity in the future—expanding facilities or acquiring new capital equipment.

Also consider the saver’s perspective. Saving indicates a lower desire to consume in the present. This is another incentive for businesses to invest in the future rather than produce and sell things now. On the other hand, if people possess an intense desire to consume right now, they will save less, making it less affordable for businesses to carry out long-term projects. But the big supply of consumer dollars makes it a good time to produce and sell.

Thus the interest rate coordinates production across time. It ensures a compatible mix of market forces: if people want to consume now, businesses respond accordingly; if people want to consume in the future, businesses allocate resources to satisfy that desire. The interest rate can perform this coordinating function only if it is allowed to move freely in response to changes in supply and demand. If the Fed manipulates the interest rate, we should not be surprised by discoordination on a massive scale.

But suppose the Fed lowers rates so that they no longer reflect the true state of consumer demand and economic conditions. Artificially low interest rates mislead investors into thinking that now is a good time to invest in long-term projects. But the public has indicated no intention to postpone consumption and free up resources that firms can devote to those developments. On the contrary, the lower interest rates encourage them to save less and consume more. So even if some of these projects can be finished, with the public’s saving relatively low, the necessary purchasing power won’t be around later, when businesses hope to cash in on their investments.

And as a company works toward completing its projects under these conditions, it will find that the resources it needs—labor, materials, replacement parts—are not available in sufficient quantities. The prices will therefore be higher, and firms will need to borrow to finance these unanticipated increases in input prices. This increased demand for borrowing will raise the interest rate. Reality now begins to set in: some of these projects cannot be completed.

Moreover, the kind of projects that are started differ from those that would have been started on the free market. Mises draws an analogy between an economy under the influence of artificially low interest rates and a homebuilder who believes he has more resources—more bricks, say—than he really does. He will build a house much different than he would have chosen if he had known his true supply of bricks. But he will not be able to complete this larger house, so the sooner he discovers his true brick supply the better, for then he can adjust his production plans before too many of his resources are squandered. If he only finds out in the final stages, he will have to destroy everything but the foundation, and will be poorer for his malinvestment.

In the short run, the result of the central bank’s lowering of interest rates is the apparent prosperity of the boom period. Stocks and real estate shoot up. New construction is everywhere, businesses are expanding, people are enjoying a high standard of living. But the economy is on a sugar high, and reality inevitably sets in. Some of these investments will prove unsustainable.

That is one of the reasons the Fed cannot simply pump more credit into the economy and keep the boom going. Yet the economist John Maynard Keynes—back in fashion even though his system collapsed in the early 1970s when it couldn’t account for stagflation—proposed exactly this: “The remedy for the boom is not a higher rate of interest but a lower rate of interest! For that may enable the so-called boom to last. The right remedy for the trade cycle is not to be found in abolishing booms and thus keeping us permanently in a semi-slump; but in abolishing slumps and keeping us permanently in a quasi-boom.”

Keynes was dealing in fantasy. The more the Fed inflates, the worse the reckoning will be. Every new wave of artificial credit deforms the capital structure further, making the inevitable bust more severe because so much more capital will have been squandered and so many more resources misallocated.

As it becomes clear that so much of the boom is unsustainable, pressure builds for liquidation of malinvestments. The misdirected capital, if salvageable, needs to be freed up. Should the Fed ignore this and simply carry on inflating the money supply, Mises warned, it runs the risk of hyperinflation, a severe, galloping inflation that destroys the currency unit.

Writing during the Great Depression, Hayek scolded those who thought they could inflate their way out of the disaster:

Instead of furthering the inevitable liquidation of the maladjustments brought about by the boom during the last three years, all conceivable means have been used to prevent that readjustment from taking place; and one of these means, which has been repeatedly tried though without success, from the earliest to the most recent stages of depression, has been this deliberate policy of credit expansion. …

To combat the depression by a forced credit expansion is to attempt to cure the evil by the very means which brought it about; because we are suffering from a misdirection of production, we want to create further misdirection—a procedure that can only lead to a much more severe crisis as soon as the credit expansion comes to an end. … It is probably to this experiment, together with the attempts to prevent liquidation once the crisis had come, that we owe the exceptional severity and duration of the depression.

Although painful, the recession or depression phase of the cycle is not where the damage is done. The bust is the period in which the economy sloughs off the capital misallocation, re-establishes the structure of production along sustainable lines, and restores itself to health. The damage is done during the boom phase, the period of false prosperity. It is then that the artificial lowering of interest rates causes the misdirection of capital and the initiation of unsustainable investments. It is then that resources that would genuinely have satisfied consumer demand are diverted into projects that make sense only in light of artificial conditions. For the mistaken bricklayer, the damage wasn’t done when he tore down the large house he couldn’t complete; the damage was done when he laid the bricks too broadly.

Investment adviser Peter Schiff draws an analogy between an artificial boom and a circus that comes to town for a few weeks. When the circus arrives, its performers and the crowds it attracts patronize local businesses. Now suppose a restaurant owner mistakenly concludes that this boom will endure and responds by building an addition. As soon as the circus leaves town, he finds he has tragically miscalculated.

Does it make sense to inflate this poor businessman’s way out of his predicament? Creating new money doesn’t create any new stuff, so lending him newly created money merely allows him to draw more of the economy’s resource pool to himself, at the expense of genuine businesses that cater to real consumer wishes. This restaurant is a bubble activity that can survive only under the phony conditions of the circus boom. It needs to come to an end so that the resources it employs can be reallocated to more sensible lines of production.

One more point is important to remember: all firms are affected by the artificial boom, not just those that embarked on new projects or came into existence thanks to artificially cheap credit. Mises observed, “in order to continue production on the enlarged scale brought about by the expansion of credit, all entrepreneurs, those who did expand their activities no less than those who produce only within the limits in which they produced previously, need additional funds as the costs of production are now higher.”

Notice that the precipitating factor has nothing to do with the market economy. It is the government’s policy of pushing interest rates below the level at which the free market would have set them. The central bank is a government institution, established by government legislation, whose personnel are appointed by government, and which enjoys government-granted monopoly privileges. It bears repeating: the central bank’s interventions into the economy give rise to the business cycle, and the central bank is not a free-market institution.

But why can’t businessmen simply learn to distinguish between low interest rates that reflect an increase in genuine savings and low interest rates that reflect nothing more than Fed manipulation? Why do they not avoid expanding when the Fed ignites an artificial boom?

It is not so easy. Even businessmen who know that the Fed is keeping interest rates artificially low may still find it in their interest to borrow and launch new projects, hoping they can get out before the bust hits. If they do not react to the lower rates, their competitors surely will and might be able to gain market share at their expense. Someone will take the bait.

This does not, and is not intended to, account for the length of a depression. It is a theory of the artificial boom, which culminates in the bust. The bust period is longer the more government prevents the economy from reallocating labor and capital into a sustainable pattern of production. Government interference, in the form of wage or price controls, emergency lending, additional liquidity, or further monetary inflation—all aimed at diminishing short-term pain—exacerbate long-term agony. Malinvestments need to be discontinued and liquidated, not encouraged and subsidized, if the economy’s capital structure is to return to a sustainable condition.

There will always be those who, not understanding the situation, will call for more and greater monetary injections to try to keep the boom going, and their number has skyrocketed since the fall of 2008. In mid-December, the Fed set its federal-funds target at 0 to 0.25 percent, the Keynesian dream. Blinded by the same folly, Bank of England governor Mervyn King said he was ready to reduce rates to “whatever level is necessary,” including as low as zero—a move sure to perpetuate the misallocations of the boom and set the state for a far worse crisis.

Keynesian “pump priming,” whereby governments fund public-works projects, often financed by deficits, are another destructive if inexplicably fashionable course of action, based on the modern superstition that the very act of spending is the path to economic health. Take from the economy as a whole and pour resources into particular sectors: that should make us rich! Economic historian Robert Higgs compared plans like these to taking water from the deep end of a pool, pouring it into the shallow end, and expecting the water level to rise.

Additional public-works spending not only deprives the private sector of resources by taxing people to support these projects, it diverts resources toward firms that may need to be liquidated and drives up interest rates if the projects are funded by government borrowing, thereby making bank credit tighter for private firms. These projects are the very opposite of what the fragile bust economy calls for. It needs to shift resources swiftly into the production of goods in line with consumer demand, with as little resource waste as possible. Government, on the other hand, has no way of knowing how much of something to produce, using what materials and production methods. Private firms use a profit-and-loss test to gauge how well they are meeting consumer needs. If they make profits, the market has ratified their production decisions. If they post losses, they have squandered resources that could have been more effectively employed on behalf of consumer welfare elsewhere in the economy. Government has no such feedback mechanism since it acquires its resources not through voluntary means but through seizure from the citizens, and no one can choose not to buy what it produces. These projects squander wealth at a time of falling living standards and a need for the greatest possible efficiency with existing resources.

Neither can the state seem to resist the temptation to extend emergency credit to failing businesses. If their positions were sound, credit would be forthcoming from the private sector. If not, then they should go out of business, freeing up resources to be used by more capable stewards. Diverting resources from those who have successfully met consumer demands to those who have not serves only to weaken the economy and make recovery that much more difficult.

One argument has it that economic bubbles, sectors of the economy in which prices are artificially high, are caused by psychological factors that lead people to become irrationally committed to the production of particular kinds of goods. Such explanations may play a role in determining exactly which path the business cycle will take and which assets will be overvalued, but they cannot by themselves explain the bubble economy. Manias may steer overinvestment in one direction or another, but it’s the Federal Reserve pressing the accelerator.

Mises reminds us that a sudden drive for a particular kind of investment will raise the prices of complementary factors of production as well as the interest rate itself. For a mania-driven boom to persist, there has to be an increasing supply of credit to fund it, since investments in that sector would grow steadily more costly over time. This could not occur in the absence of credit expansion.

The best way to avoid bursting economic bubbles and to clean up the wreckage caused by artificial booms is to not initiate artificial booms in the first place. This would mean abandoning our superstitions about the expertise of Fed officials and their ability to manage our monetary system. But it’s about time we listened to people who have a coherent theory to explain why these crises occur, saw this crisis coming, and have something to suggest other than juvenile fantasies about spending and inflating our way to prosperity. The choice is stark: we can follow the suggestions that prolonged the Great Depression or we can try a different approach that actually accounts for what is happening.

That would be change we can believe in.

http://www.amconmag.com/article/2009/mar/09/00012/

The Harding Way



Thomas E Woods: Economist, Historian & Funny Guy

Very interesting piece from Thomas Woods that explores how President Warren Harding successfully dealt with the sharp economic downturn of 1920. With honesty and candor that, Harding told the public that allowing a market correction (of distortions brought on by Wilson's inflationary policies) was a painful but necessary step to regain long term economic health. If more historians were better versed in economics they would ask why most economic downturns lasted 2 or 3 years, while under FDR the great depressions spanned more than a decade. Unfortunately President Obama is earnestly repeating the failed policies of FDR. To view a video of this discussion, click here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=czcUmnsprQI


The Harding Way

The president infamous for Teapot Dome knew that cutting government was the best way to end a depression.

By Thomas E. Woods Jr.

When Barack Obama urged passage of his so-called stimulus measure in February, he claimed that only bold government action would prevent the economy from slipping into a deep depression. In making that argument, he was only repeating the conventional wisdom, according to which markets are not self-correcting—except in the very long run—and state intervention is necessary to revive economic activity.

Economic theory can tell us why these claims are incorrect and why, in fact, even the appearance of prosperity that those measures can produce causes still greater damage and leads to a more severe correction in the long run. But we can also refer to the testimony of history. In particular, the depression of 1920-21, which most people have never heard of, is an example of the resumption of prosperity in the absence of government stimulus, indeed in the face of its very opposite. If economies cannot turn around without these interventions, then what happened in this instance should not have been possible. But it was.

During and after World War I, the Federal Reserve inflated the money supply substantially. Once the Fed finally began to raise the discount rate—the rate at which it lends to banks—the economy slowed as it started readjusting to reality. By the middle of 1920, the downturn had become severe, with production falling by 21 percent over the next 12 months. The number of unemployed people jumped from 2.1 million in 1920 to 4.9 million in 1921.

From 1929 onward, Herbert Hoover and then Franklin Roosevelt tried to fight an economic depression by making labor costlier to hire. Warren G. Harding, on the other hand, said in the 1920 acceptance speech he delivered upon receiving the Republican nomination, “I would be blind to the responsibilities that mark this fateful hour if I did not caution the wage-earners of America that mounting wages and decreased production can lead only to industrial and economic ruin.” Harding elsewhere explained that wages, like prices, would need to come down to reflect post-bubble economic realities.

Few American presidents are less in fashion among historians than Harding, who is routinely portrayed as a bumbling fool who stumbled into the presidency. Yet whatever his intellectual shortcomings—and they have been grotesquely exaggerated, as recent scholars have admitted—and whatever the moral foibles that afflicted him, he understood the fundamentals of boom, bust, and recovery better than any 20th-century president.

Harding likewise condemned inflation: “Gross expansion of currency and credit have depreciated the dollar just as expansion and inflation have discredited the coins of the world. We inflated in haste, we must deflate in deliberation. We debased the dollar in reckless finance, we must restore in honesty.”

And instead of promising to blow unprecedented sums, he called for cutting back:

We will attempt intelligent and courageous deflation, and strike at government borrowing which enlarges the evil, and we will attack high cost of government with every energy and facility which attend Republican capacity. We promise that relief which will attend the halting of waste and extravagance, and the renewal of the practice of public economy, not alone because it will relieve tax burdens but because it will be an example to stimulate thrift and economy in private life.

The economy, Harding explained in his Inaugural Address the following year, had “suffered the shocks and jars incident to abnormal demands, credit inflations, and price upheavals.” Now the country was enduring the inevitable adjustment. No shortcuts were possible:

All the penalties will not be light, nor evenly distributed. There is no way of making them so. There is no instant step from disorder to order. We must face a condition of grim reality, charge off our losses and start afresh. It is the oldest lesson of civilization. … No altered system will work a miracle. Any wild experiment will only add to the confusion. Our best assurance lies in efficient administration of our proven system.

Harding was true to his word, carrying on budget cuts that had begun under a debilitated Woodrow Wilson. Federal spending declined from $6.3 billion in 1920 to $5 billion in 1921 and $3.3 billion in 1922. Tax rates, meanwhile, were slashed—for every income group. And over the course of the 1920s, the national debt was reduced by one third.

In contrast to Japan, which engaged in massive government intervention in 1920 that paralyzed its economy and contributed to a severe banking crisis seven years later, the U.S. allowed its economy to readjust. “In 1920-21,” says economist Benjamin Anderson,

we took our losses, we readjusted our financial structure, we endured our depression, and in August 1921 we started up again. … The rally in business production and employment that started in August 1921 was soundly based on a drastic cleaning up of credit weakness, a drastic reduction in the costs of production, and on the free play of private enterprise. It was not based on governmental policy designed to make business good.

That is not supposed to happen, or at least not nearly so quickly, in the absence of fiscal or monetary stimulus. But who are you going to believe, Paul Krugman or your own eyes?

Naturally, some modern economists who have looked into the matter have been stumped as to how economic recovery could have occurred in the absence of their cherished proposals. Robert Gordon, a Keynesian, admits, “government policy to moderate the depression and speed recovery was minimal. The Federal Reserve authorities were largely passive. … Despite the absence of a stimulative government policy, however, recovery was not long delayed.” Kenneth Weiher, an economic historian, notes, “despite the severity of the contraction, the Fed did not move to use its powers to turn the money supply around and fight the contraction.” He then briskly concedes that “the economy rebounded quickly from the 1920-1921 depression and entered a period of quite vigorous growth,” but (as with most such historians) he chooses not to dwell on this development or learn anything from it.
Weiher, in fact, notes with some condescension that “this was 1921, long before the concept of countercyclical policy was accepted or even understood.” Er, yes, and lacking those indispensable tools, the American economy rebounded all the same.

The reader has probably noticed that Harding’s advice and course of action are basically the exact opposite of the conventional wisdom in political and media circles today. The government has to do something, we’re told. Barack Obama has said that economic downturns degenerate into long-term depressions because governments fail to act with sufficient vigor to head them off.

It is not mere coincidence that the economy returned to health relatively quickly following the downturn of 1920, while on the other hand depression conditions persisted throughout the 1930s, a decade of government activism. It is precisely because monetary and fiscal stimulus measures were avoided that sound economic progress was possible.

The very ideas of fiscal and monetary stimulus stem from a misdiagnosis of the causes of economic depressions and then apply exactly the wrong remedies. The problem is not with an inadequate level of spending, but that in the wake of a central bank-induced boom, the capital structure is out of conformity with consumer demand. The recession is the period in which this mismatch is rectified through the reallocation of capital into more appropriate channels. Fiscal and monetary stimulus only interferes with and delays this purgative process.

Harding, unlike our political class today, actually understood this. The 20th-century president we’re most taught to hate saw the United States through an even worse downturn than the one we’re experiencing now by simply allowing the free market to make the necessary adjustments. And Harding, as his remarks indicate, pursued the policies he did not out of inertia or because he was incapable of conceiving of alternative approaches. This despised figure was in fact a far better economist than most of the geniuses who presume to instruct us now.

Today we have a president urging us to learn the lessons of history, and there are indeed lessons to be learned. But to the state and its purchased intellectuals, history is an instrument to be placed at the service of the propaganda demands of the moment, not an impartial source of wisdom or instruction.

That’s why watching events unfold in our own time is like watching a slow-motion train wreck. We know it has to end in disaster, and we’re helpless to stop it. We know politicians won’t learn whatever lessons history has to teach. But if they won’t learn them, we must, if only to prepare ourselves for the disaster that is coming.

Thomas E. Woods Jr. is the author of nine books, most recently the New York Times bestseller Meltdown.



http://amconmag.com/article/2009/may/04/00024/

Who Dunnit?


Thomas Woods asks the question - who killed the constitution? As usual an insightful and amusing presentation from Mr. Woods.

Part I

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZ83x9rn2o4

Part II

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TKAq3sXwXeM

Part III

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kSlRZuZsI14

Part IV

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kJP19RLalMA

Part V

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PVfbJlCCDhA