Welcome Aboard NPR?

My more dedicated readers have probably noticed that I now host a link to the National Public Radio's website. "How," you may ask, "does someone who is so beholden to conservative principles support an organization that is (partially) government funded, with a liberal bend?" 


To start off with, the quality and depth of the reporting trumps the bias, which they have made efforts to address. In an age of banal, celebrity driven "news," geared towards a public with an increasingly diminishing attention span, I welcome their dry and detail driven reporting. And even when I find their coverage biased, I am thankful that they bring economic, scientific and cultural developments to my attention, that other major media outlets do not. On my own time I try to research them in depth, so I can form a more independent, informed outlook.

Regarding questions of government funding, in the context of the billions and billions of dollars in subsidies doled out to special interests, the limited funds provided to improve the level of education, culture and public discourse are hardly disconcerting. And until we address the entitlement programs and military spending that drive the growth of the national debt, public support of NPR and PBS, which constitutes less than 1% of the federal budget would not be justified, as least from a fiscal perspective. And the fact that voluntary individual and corporate contributions constitute the majority of their funding may be the main reason why this is one of the few contemporary examples of a successful public-private partnership.

A Healthy Serving of Skepticism in the Obesity Debate

As the rising rate of obesity has cost the nation billions in added health care costs, much needed discussions about healthy eating have become more prevalent. The dominant narrative is that a host of external causes, like "food deserts," "aggressive advertising" and the "high cost of healthy food" are responsible for the widespread and detrimental consumption of junk food. But, unfortunately few Americans, even in the educated classes have approached the official narrative with even a modicum of skepticism and sough to verify its claims. Research have emerged that have cast doubt on many of the claims put forth by government and media figures. For example, in most cases, proximity to a grocery store did not increase consumption of healthy foods and in most consumers can purchase healthy fruits and vegetables at a lower cost than junk food. Anecdotal evidence seems to support the researcher's conclusions, because on every occasion that I visit my neighborhood grocery store, I witness consumers choosing unhealthy, processed foods, over healthy, affordable staples (like lentils, broccoli and tilapia). This is not simply an empty academic debate, because the flawed narrative will lead to flawed policies that will do little to stem the rising tide of obesity.

5 Myths About Healthy Eating

A helping of skepticism about the causes of Americans’ poor eating habits—and the effectiveness of political fixes

Katherine Mangu-Ward | October 21, 2011

New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie’s decision to stay out of the Republican presidential race means that the American people will be spared months of discussion about his ample waistline and the bad example it sets. Nonetheless, with first lady Michelle Obama urging everyone to get moving, obesity remains a political hot potato, or maybe a tater tot. Below, a helping of skepticism about the causes of Americans’ poor eating habits—and the effectiveness of political fixes.


1.  People in poor neighborhoods lack access to fresh fruits and vegetables.

 Walk into nearly any supermarket in the United States, and you are immediately confronted with abundance—bok choy, mangos, melons and avocados from across the globe—where a couple of varieties of apples and carrots once struggled to fill shelf space.

But not everyone has easy access to this fruity phantasmagoria. If you’re picking up ingredients for dinner at a gas station or a convenience store, you probably live in what eggheads have taken to calling a “food desert”—an ill-defined concept with powerful policy implications. A commonly cited 2009 statistic from the U.S. Department of Agriculture has 23.5 million Americans living in poor urban and rural areas with limited access to fresh food.

Making those food deserts bloom is a centerpiece of Michelle Obama’s anti-obesity agenda. This January found the first lady smiling for the cameras with Wal-Mart executives in Southeast Washington and declaring herself “more hopeful than ever” as she tours the nation’s produce sections.

But the prevalence of food deserts is almost certainly overstated. Not having a supermarket in your Zip code isn’t the last word in access to healthy food. According to the USDA, 93 percent of “desert” dwellers have access to a car. And farmers markets, often overlooked in surveys of rich and poor neighborhoods alike, have tripled since 1994.

Still, it does seem reasonable that making it easier to buy fresh food would improve what people eat. However, a study published this year in the Archives of Internal Medicine, the first to measure the impact of access to fresh food on diet, followed 5,000 people for over 15 years and found something surprising: Proximity to a grocery store or supermarket doesn’t increase consumption of healthy food. That suggests that a lack of convenient leafy greens isn’t the problem. Dinner menus are the product of subtle and pervasive food cultures, which can’t be tweaked from the East Wing.

The primary beneficiaries of tax incentives and other nudges aimed at abolishing food deserts are big grocery chains, not poor shoppers.

2. Advertising forces people to make unhealthy choices.

Television-bound children, their eyes awhirl with images of Tony the Tiger and his high-fructose friends, haunt the debate about junk-food advertising. And any parent who has ever experienced a 2-year-old’s grocery store meltdown would certainly like to have someone to blame. But the Institute of Medicine, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences, has concluded that “current evidence is not sufficient to arrive at any finding about a causal relationship from television advertising to adiposity [excess weight] among children and youth.” Similar findings hold true for adults.

We don’t need advertisers to tell us that candy is delicious. Humans were big fans of fat and sugar long before the idiot box was invented. We’re programmed to go for the good (bad) stuff. Sure, Kellogg’s and General Mills have big advertising budgets, but they’re nowhere near as powerful as Darwin. Cracking down on advertisers gives politicians a scapegoat, but it doesn’t make kids, or their parents, healthier.

3.  Eating healthy is too expensive.

 A dinner of hot dogs and Devil Dogs is undeniably cheap. But a bowl of beans and rice with a banana on the side is cheaper. A survey by the USDA found that, by weight, bottled watek is cheaper than high-fat, and whole fruit is cheaper than processed sweet snacks. Preparing a big pot of lentils for the week may be not be glamorous, but it’s much cheaper and not much more time-consuming than cooking up frozen pizza or mac and cheese.

The New York Times’ Mark Bittman—no fan of Frito-Lay—writes that the idea that junk food is cheaper than real food is “just plain wrong” and that blaming unhealthy habits on cost is incorrect. People who eat lots of unhealthy food aren’t doing so because they lack cheap, healthy options. Instead, it’s because they like junk food. Making junk food comparatively more pricey by tacking on taxes—a proposal that has been revived many times by Yale’s Kelly Brownell (and recently made into law in Denmark)—mostly means that people will pay more taxes, not eat more kale.

4.  People need more information about what they eat.

It’s hard to argue against rules that give consumers more information. Perhaps for that reason, proposals to require restaurants to jam calorie, fat and other nutrition statistics onto already crowded signs and menus pop up over and over—most recently as part of the health-care reform law—despite the fact that virtually all major fast-food chains already provide such information on handouts and online.

Knowing that a chocolate shake at Shake Shack has 740 calories doesn’t stop me—or the first lady— from ordering one occasionally. We’re not alone: Studies consistently find that menu labeling doesn’t result in healthier choices. A recent study from Ghent University in Belgium found that labels made no difference in the consumption patterns of students there, backing up a 2009 New York University study that found no improvement in poor New Yorkers’ eating habits after the introduction of mandatory menu labeling in the Big Apple.

5.  There are too many fast-food restaurants in low-income neighborhoods.

In many urban neighborhoods, it’s easier to get permission to open a sex shop than a Taco Bell, thanks to aggressive policies by local zoning boards. But zoning out fast-food restaurants in cities is a lost cause—they are probably already too thick on the ground for new restrictions to alter the culinary mix. The same study that found no effect on diet from increased access to fruits and vegetables also found that proximity to fast-food restaurants had only a small effect, and it was limited to young, low-income men.

In a commentary accompanying the study, Jonathan E. Fielding and Paul A. Simon of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health wrote that “policy efforts to reduce access to [junk food], though politically challenging, will likely have a greater impact on reducing the obesity epidemic than efforts focused solely on increasing access to fresh produce and other healthy options.” “Politically challenging” is code for “virtually impossible.”

And for good reason. Eliminating access to fast food and other junk food means taking away choices, something Americans don’t tend to like, even (or perhaps especially) when it’s for their own good.

Katherine Mangu-Ward is the managing editor of Reason. This article originally appeared in The Washington Post on October 14, 2011

On the Clash of Cultures (Part I)

Far too often debates on immigration and cultural diversity are framed in terms of the relative worth of different cultures and different groups. Are the values and norms of group A better than group B? Should group A assimilate or should group B accommodate? Rather than get distracted on contentious and largely subjective debates, we should focus on the indisputable fact of cultural clash. More specifically, wise policy must take into account the reality that when a sufficient number of sufficiently distinct cultural groups reside in the same space, tension arises. Imagine if 10,000 deeply traditional and conservative baptists from rural Mississippi and Alabama moved to the culturally and politically liberal San Francisco Bay area each year. We can be certain that in a short time tension between the native San Franciscans and southern migrants would emerge as the latter failed to assimilate to the norms of the former. As their presence grew, so would their political assertiveness and they would work to shape the laws (on gay marriage, abortion, religious expression, business regulation, taxation, etc.) of their new city to resemble those of the south. At that point even the most tolerant San Franciscan would grow resentful of the growing number of "red neck interlopers."

Why should it be any different with the millions of deeply conservative Muslim migrants in France? Rather than debate if the North Africans migrants should adopt the values and norms of their new homes or if Western Europeans should be more tolerant of burqas, polygamy and other alien practices, we should view this as an example of mutually alienation. We should question the wisdom of the politicians and bureaucrats who promoted the immigration and cultural policies that planted the seeds for this clash of cultures. A more sound policy would have been to welcome in the more educated, secular, western segments of Muslim societies, those who held the greatest potential to quickly assimilate to social and economic life in France. For this very reason, the assimilation of Muslims into American Society has by and large been successful. But, in the parlance of multiculturalism, assimilation is a dirty word. A growing number of critical thinkers are placing unconditional multiculturalism in the same category as communism, a belief system that's good in theory but disastrous in practice.

The Middle Path To Understanding (And Addressing) The Racial Achievement Gap

The existence of a glaring achievement gap among different racial and ethnic groups within the United States is widely known. When we analyze rates of high school graduation, college attendance, unemployment, income, incarceration, obesity and out of wedlock births, we find that Asian-Americans enjoy the most positive outcomes, followed by European-Americans and then Hispanic-Americans with African- Americans demonstrating the most troublesome statistics. Where the greatest disagreement lies in on the explanation for this persistent phenomena. Progressive explanations typically center on the following factors of continued Institutional Racism and White Privilege. Whereas, conservative explanations usually discount racism, instead focusing on: cultural pathologies that encourage poor social and economic strategies.

The first glaring problem with the progressive explanation is that not only have Asian-Americans outperformed European-Americans in every social and economic measure, but so have African Immigrants. For example, 43.8% of African Immigrants are college graduates, which greatly exceeds the national average of 23.1%. If the "white power structure" and "institutional racism" are the deciding factors in educational and economic achievement, how is it possible that Indian, Japanese and Chinese immigrants have risen so quickly and are now doing better than whites? And interestingly this same phenomena is mirrored on an international level, with East Asian nations experiencing outstripping most European Nations in educational and even economic output. This clearly demonstrates the economic and social welfare are not static phenomena; throughout history, the fortunes of individuals, groups, nations and even regions have risen and fallen.

This phenomena become much clearer when we "look at the trees" rather than at the "forest, i.e. focus on specific, individual values, behaviors and choices that increase or decrease an individual's chance for improving their economic and social trajectory. The reason I chose to focus on trajectory, is because comparing the absolute outcome of (let's say) the child of a working class immigrant to a well established, middle class family would neither be fair nor allow us to fully determine the effect of culture and choice. But, comparing the relative improvement or decline of each individual or group would allow us to do so. And exploring the multi-generation trajectory of families and groups paints an even clearer pictures of the dynamics that government social and economic assent and decline. 

Or, to be even more specific, we could ask ourselves what advise would we give to a friend or family member about how to improve their chances for success? Here are the most obvious: dedicate more time to studying, at all costs do not drop out of high school, do not have a child before you graduate, do not have a child until you are married and financially stable, avoid engaging in behaviors that run the risk of arrest,  if possible choose a highly marketable field of study, such as math, science and engineering, live beneath your means, establish a good credit history, save and invest in the future. While making the right choices are not absolute determinants of one's trajectory, no one can deny that there exists a very strong correlation between choices, behaviors and outcomes. When we "compare apples to apples," or the more upwardly mobile to  the less upwardly mobile components of the African-American community, we will certainly encounter markedly different approaches to family, education, employment, saving and investment strategies. And unless we are hopelessly intellectually dishonest, we will see that the same is true for more (and less) upwardly mobile ethnic groups. To put it simply, Indians and African Immigrants have risen so quickly, because a higher percentage of their respective groups adopted values, choices and strategies that are conducive to success and African-Americans and (to a lesser extent) Hispanic and European-Americans have not. 

There is a balanced middle path that does not look at issues of social pathology as an either / or phenomena; they acknowledge the continued effects of racism, but believe that they are greatly amplified by the prevailing culture, values and behaviors of individuals and communities alike. In this day and age, such choices have a far greater bearing on the social and economic welfare of individuals and communities than racism and white privilege. For example, many African-American communities are provided by substandard schools, whose negative effects are amplified by the insufficient commitment to learning and discipline present in many families. But, those who take the middle way differ from most conservatives by their acknowledgement that culture and behavior do not occur in a vacuum; they are products of one's history and experience. In other words, the most pernicious aspect of America's long history of racist oppression is that it degraded the social and cultural capital of its victims, leaving them in a state in which they cannot fully capitalize on the rapidly expanding opportunities of a free society.

Decimate a  people's common culture, outlaw education for 5 generations and provide shamefully substandard schooling for 3 more and it will not come as a surprise that a substantial portion of the next generations will be left without a tradition of learning. Subject several generations to slavery and bar their descendants from all but the most menial professions and do not be surprised if the next generations do not see the connection of work and discipline to upward mobility. And then finally when you acknowledge the magnitude of the crime you committed against a whole people, you seek to make amends by the massive expansion of the welfare state that renders a portion of the beleaguered community dependent on the state, with their traditional family structure eviscerated. Part of this tragic drama are the "experts" and "activists" who treat the battered community like children and passive agents who are incapable of shaping their environment and their destinies, like other communities have done so before them. Their refusal to assign any responsibility to diverse communities for the problems that they face may stem from a well meaning prohibition against "blaming the victim," but it has eroded their capacity to acknowledge and address the pathological behaviors and cultural patterns that play a major role in shaping disparate outcomes.

The view of the Middle Way begs the questions: What can be done? If personal choice and culture are driving forces in the trajectory of individuals, communities and cultures, can the state do anything to induce real, positive change? Relatively to progressives, who have deep faith in the power of the state to shape equal outcomes, classical liberals (libertarians) believe that at best the state can expand equal opportunity. The problem is not that universities are discriminating against diverse groups, quite to the contrary, most are religiously pursuing "diversity" and "equal outcomes." Rather, the dearth of qualified high school graduates means that far too diverse students are able to capitalize on these unprecedented opportunities. So, improving the dismal schools that diverse communities face is of paramount importance. Without real improvement in educational outcomes, progress will remain elusive and economic inequality will continue to worsen.

How schools can be improved is truly a vexing question, because more than a half century of efforts by the educational establishment to bridge achievement gaps have bore little fruit. Rather than repeat the tried and failed formula of: increased funding, increased federalization and the pursuit of unproven pedagogic fads, a new paradigm must approached: school choice and competition. Unlike most of my conservative brethren, I make no illusions that the said factors can improve failing schools, but at the very least they can offer expanded opportunity for the students who are willing and able to pursue them. And on an even broader level, the education establishment must shift its focus from the study of failure, towards understanding and promoting the norms, values, behaviors and strategies that upwardly groups (Asian-Americans) and nations have pursued. As painful as it may be to admit, not only do schools shape their students, but students and their families have a central role in determining the quality of the schools. So, without a shift in the values, norms and behaviors that predominate in a community, even the most well run schools will still produce dismal results.

This brings us to the topic of welfare. As a classical liberal (libertarian) I would like to see welfare in its present form significantly reduced. However, until we arrive at that improbable point, the best we can hope for is to reform welfare programs so that they will subsidize positive, rather than pathological choices. Increasing subsidies for welfare recipients who choose to not have more children (than they can afford and educate) may constitute excessive social engineering for most conservatives, but would ultimately offer a net decrease in expenditures and provide incentives for positive behavioral changes. In addition, the incentive structure that governs social welfare agencies needs to be transformed; social workers and bureaucrats who are able to help their clients transition away from dependency and pathology should be offered bonuses. Mandating full time employment, even "menial jobs" that "Americans won't do" for all adults in a household that receive welfare is essential for breaking the cycle of dependency and re-establishing a culture of work.

Ultimately what characterizes the middle way is intellectual honesty, a belief that we must allow facts and reason to carry us to logical conclusions, now matter how uncomfortable they make us, no matter how offensive others find them. For using sophistry to support comfortable narratives will spare feelings, but will lead us to continue pursuing the ineffective paths and policies of the last half century. The first step towards real compassion is adopting the intellectually honesty acknowledgement that past racism casts its heavy shadow on the present via the persistence of widespread cultural and behavioral pathology. Failure to do so will doom future generations to even greater economic and social inequality; a more racist outcome I cannot imagine.

Rembetiko, Music of My Heart

Pictured Above: Semsis, Eskenazi and Tomboulis

One of my favorite musical genres is Rembetiko, the soulful, inventive music of the Greeks of Anatolia (Asia Minor). This style is rich with Ottoman, Persian and Arabic influences, both musical and cultural and many of its great performers were Ottoman Jews and Armenians. A study of the Ottoman Empire highlights the wonderful and destructive power of multiculturalism and diversity. On one hand the incredibly rich mix of cultures, races, religions and languages produced some of the most amazing music, architecture, poetry and cuisine that has graced the world. On the other hand, it bred conflict, instability and the first Genocide of the century, ultimately leading Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria to undertake a massive population exchange, with the goal of creating more homogeneous, stable and peaceful nations. If I had to derive a one line line lesson from the Ottoman Experience for the United States, it would be as follows: enjoy the cultural blessings that diversity bring, but tread carefully, for human beings are flawed creatures of conflict. Here is a wonderful song performed in 1929 by Andonis Dalgas and one performed by the prodigious Roza Eskenazi.

Return Of The Worthy Poor?

While leafing through a university text book for a course in social work, I came across an interesting chapter on the history of charity and the welfare state. The author described and rejected prior efforts to delineate the "worthy poor" from the "unworthy poor." This concept holds that the former are comprised of individuals unable to care for themselves because they were sick, orphaned, elderly, etc. The latter are able bodied individuals whose impoverishment was conceived to stem from their pathological values, habits and choices.

Philanthropists that subscribed to this vision believed that the right to receive assistance was accompanied by the responsibility of the poor to demonstrate their willingness to work. Even progressive reformers and champions of the poor, like Jane Addams, who emphasized "structural factors" in poverty, actively sought to promote middle class values of personal responsibility, self control, sobriety and thrift among the poor families that they assisted. Later generations of reformers and progressives criticized her for this and (what they perceived to be) her efforts to "acculturate" diverse immigrants to America towards white, Anglo-American culture. Many felt that efforts to address the behavior of the poor unjustly "blamed the victim" and distracted from "oppression" and "institutional causes of poverty." Furthermore, if food, housing, health care and child care were "fundamental rights," by definition one could someone be unworthy of them. Many of the architects of the modern welfare state held and actively promoted this worldview, presumably not only on philosophical grounds, but also because government bureaucrats neither had the ability or even the will to intimately interact with recipients of aid as philanthropists had. The unprecedented post war economic boom, from the late 1940's to the 1990's, coupled with the growth of deficit financing allowed for the vast expansion of size and scope of the welfare state and accepted notions of eligibility.

Anyone who follows the news sees that the federal government, as well as most city, state and county governments are facing mounting debt. On a local level this has forced politicians to begin cutting government services, whereas the federal government's capacity to borrow and print money will, for the time being, allow it to avoid austerity measures. I am convinced that growing financial pressures will force governments to not only enact broad budget cuts, but to engage in contentious, but necessary efforts to prioritize the use of limited funds. The public and politicians will have to determine if funds should be directed towards (badly needed) programs for the mentally ill and disabled or towards fraud ridden section-8 housing vouchers. Progressives who wish to prevent the dissolution of the safety net will have to become conscience and critical of the strain that pathological behaviors, such as unchecked single motherhood and sloth place on the system. So, if not in word, at least in practice, limited government resources will force us to determine who is more and who is less worthy of receiving scarce funds. And the much maligned shame and social stigma that welfare dependency engendered may even be promoted as a cost effective means to maintain sustainable levels of participation. This should be viewed not as a "mean spirited condemnation of the less fortunate," but as an exercise in accounting and prioritization that all households and businesses must engage in on a regular basis.

Nothing Is Loathsome As a Bully

Pictured Above: Mitchell Wilson

My articles usually focus on questions of economic policy and not my personal feelings, but I must declare that Nothing Is Loathsome As a Bully. It broke my heart to read about how Mitchell Wilson, an 11 year old who was battling muscular dystrophy was bullied to death. My G-d be with him and his bereaved family. I hope that this serves as a wake up call to the parents and schools who have failed to teach their children basic decency and compassion, especially for those weaker than themselves.

Culture and the Welfare State

Most discussions of the welfare state are one dimensional and fail to take into account the powerful cultural factors that largely determine the success or failure of government institutions. For example, when I express my misgivings about the chances of success for of a single player health care plan in the United States, many of my progressives compatriots will respond "it works in Sweden and Finland, so why not here?!?" Indeed, the social welfare programs of the said nations are relatively successful, but this occurs in the context of homogeneous, educated populations with a culture that fosters an unusually high level of civic mindedness and very low levels of corruption. Welfare states only function when a large majority of the population possesses sufficient cultural and moral capital to not abuse the system. But, in more corrupt countries, like Pakistan and India, endemic corruption makes it challenging for the state to even perform its most basic functions, like building roads and schools. An Indian friend of mine related to me how every year the state government would send funds to his father's village the maintain roads which had not even been built, because for years local and state officials colluded to pilfer the funds. In such a cultural and moral environment, administering a semi-functional welfare state is all but impossible.

Sadly, there are examples closer to home. A recent Wall Street Journal article discussed how 9 out of the 10 zip codes for workers collecting disability payments are in Puerto Rico. This is a serious issue because the SSDI funds are projected to run out by 2018.There are many things I love about Latin American culture (music, literature, strong sense of family and friendship) but its civic and political traditions are not among them. From the Rio Grande to the Magallanes, with a few minor exceptions, similar political vices abound.With great effort cultures can change, but in our environment of cultural relativism and political correctness, discussing problems in the majority culture is challenging and in minority cultures is strictly verboten. This will certainly inhibit our ability to develop wise policies in an increasingly diverse nation.

Puerto Rico Disability Claims Probed

By DAMIAN PALETTA

The Social Security Administration's inspector general is investigating a case of potentially widespread disability fraud in Puerto Rico, two people familiar with the matter said, part of the agency's stepped-up efforts to tackle abuses in the financially struggling program.

United Press International

Inspector General Patrick O'Carroll testifying before Congress in July.

The inspector general, Patrick O'Carroll, told an audience at an Aug. 30 disability-examiners conference that the investigation was tied to a pharmaceutical plant that recently closed in Puerto Rico, with 300 employees losing their jobs.

Shortly after the layoff, 290 of the 300 former employees applied for Social Security disability benefits and they all used the same doctor, who lived far from the plant, Mr. O'Carroll told the audience. Mr. O'Carroll didn't identify the doctor, whose identity couldn't be learned.

Jonathan Lasher, an assistant inspector general at the agency, wouldn't comment on the case, but said, "The office of the inspector general is continuing to pursue any number of fraud allegations in Puerto Rico related to the Social Security disability program."

The investigation comes as part of a stepped-up presence in the U.S. commonwealth by the inspector general's office following a March article in The Wall Street Journal that showed how much easier it is to win Social Security disability benefits on the Caribbean island compared with any of the 50 U.S. states.

In 2010, the Social Security Administration awarded benefits in 63.4% of its initial decisions in Puerto Rico, compared with much lower rates elsewhere. In Arizona, for example, benefits were awarded in initial applications in 35.6% of the cases. Nine of the 10 top U.S. zip codes for workers collecting Social Security disability benefits are in Puerto Rico, according to government data.

Enlarge Image

A spokesman for the Social Security Administration said in light of "statistical trends" in Puerto Rico it has asked the inspector general's office to "make sure that these trends do not reflect an increase in fraud."

The Social Security Disability Insurance program, known as SSDI, was created in the 1950s and is used to provide financial and health-care assistance for Americans who can no longer work because of mental or physical illness or injury. It can help Americans with a range of ailments, including cancer, severe depression and chronic back pain.

The cost of the SSDI program has more than doubled in the last decade and it is projected to run out of reserves in 2017 or 2018 if changes aren't made. About 10.2 million people collected $124 billion in 2010.

Experts attribute the program's economic strains to persistently high unemployment rates and an aging population that is more prone to meeting the government's definition of having disabilities.

The system's structure has also drawn critics who charge the awarding of benefits to the needy relies too heavily on accidental factors, such as where someone applies or which judge is assigned to determine an appeal.

Doctors also play a central role in the process, as their recommendation holds large sway with examiners and judges who make decisions.

Even though SSDI is a federal program funded by payroll taxes, initial decisions about whether someone qualifies are made by state officials because of the way the program is designed. Officials in the Puerto Rican government promised full cooperation with the probe.

"We strongly support the effort to investigate this case and any incident of abuse, and will partner with federal officials to eliminate fraud in not only the disability program, but in other federal health programs like Medicare and Medicaid," Lorenzo Gonzalez, Puerto Rico's secretary of health, said in a written statement. "As with any other federal investigation involving fraud with a federal program, if a physician is found to be performing unlawfully, we will move swiftly at the local level through the state licensing board to take whatever action is needed to halt the abuse."

Mr. Gonzalez said these incidents "are not unique to Puerto Rico" and show the need for "standardized, clear cut guidelines" in determining how benefits are awarded.

Puerto Rico's unemployment rate was 15.5% in July, higher than the 9.1% national average.

Social Security Administration officials have said areas with elevated unemployment rates can translate into more applications for disability benefits.

People who are on SSDI for a set period of time can also qualify for Medicare benefits, which is one of the most attractive features of the program.

Many people remain on SSDI for years, and experts estimate that the program's benefits cost the government roughly $300,000 per beneficiary over the course of a lifetime.

Dead Souls: The Denationalization of the American Elite

Pictured Above: The Late, Great Samuel Huntington

In our previous post we touched upon the topic of the United States' increasingly denationalized elites. In his essay Dead souls: The Denationalization of the American Elite, Harvard Professor Samuel P. Huntington explores this topic, which has a major impact on social, economic and political life in the United States. Agree or disagree with Huntington he is always thought provoking and intellectually honest.


Dead Souls: The Denationalization of the American Elite 

The National Interest ^ | Spring 2004 | Samuel Huntington 

Debates over national identity are a pervasive characteristic of our time. In part, they raise rhetorical questions, but they also have profound implications for American society and American policy at home and abroad. Different perceptions--especially between the citizenry and the more cosmopolitan elites--of what constitutes national identity generate different national interests and policy priorities.

The views of the general public on issues of national identity differ significantly from those of many elites. The public, overall, is concerned with physical security but also with societal security, which involves the sustainability--within acceptable conditions for evolution--of existing patterns of language, culture, association, religion and national identity. For many elites, these concerns are secondary to participating in the global economy, supporting international trade and migration, strengthening international institutions, promoting American values abroad, and encouraging minority identities and cultures at home. The central distinction between the public and elites is not isolationism versus internationalism, but nationalism versus cosmopolitanism.

Dead Souls

In August 1804, Walter Scott finished writing The Lay of the Last Minstrel. Therein, he asked whether

"Breathes there the man with soul so dead

Who never to himself hath said:

'This is my own, my native Land?'

Whose heart hath ne'er within him burned

As home his footsteps he hath turned, . . .

From wandering on a foreign strand?"

A contemporary answer to Scott's question is: Yes, the number of dead souls is small but growing among America's business, professional, intellectual and academic elites. Possessing in Scott's words, "titles, power and pelf", they also have decreasing ties with the American nation. Coming back to America from a foreign strand, they are not likely to be overwhelmed with deep feelings of commitment to their "native land." Their attitudes and behavior contrast with the overwhelming patriotism and nationalistic identification of the rest of the American public. A major gap is growing in America between the dead or dying souls among its elites and its "Thank God for America" public. This gap was temporarily obscured by the patriotic rallying after September 11. In the absence of repeated comparable attacks, however, the pervasive and fundamental forces of economic globalization make it likely that the denationalizing of elites will continue.

Globalization involves a huge expansion in the international interactions among individuals, corporations, governments, NGOs and other entities; growth in number and size of multinational corporations investing, producing and marketing globally; and the multiplication of international organizations, regimes and regulations. The impact of these developments differs among groups and among countries. The involvement of individuals in globalizing processes varies almost directly with their socio-economic status. Elites have more and deeper transnational interests, commitments and identities than non-elites. American elites, government agencies, businesses and other organizations have been far more important in the globalization process than those of other countries. Hence there is reason for their commitments to national identities and national interests to be relatively weaker.

These developments resemble on a global basis what happened in the United States after the Civil War. As industrialization moved ahead, businesses could no longer succeed if their operations were confined to a particular locality or state. They had to go national in order to get the capital, workers and markets they needed. Ambitious individuals had to become geographically, organizationally and, to some extent, occupationally mobile, and pursue their careers on a national rather than a local basis. The growth of national corporations and other national associations promoted national viewpoints, national interests and national power. National laws and standards took precedence over state ones. National consciousness and national identity became preeminent over state and regional identities. The rise of transnationalism, although in its early stages, is somewhat similar.

Transnational ideas and people fall into three categories: universalist, economic and moralist. The universalist approach is, in effect, American nationalism and exceptionalism taken to the extreme. In this view, America is exceptional not because it is a unique nation but because it has become the "universal nation." It has merged with the world through the coming to America of people from other societies and through the widespread acceptance of American popular culture and values by other societies. The distinction between America and the world is disappearing because of the triumph of American power and the appeal of American society and culture. The economic approach focuses on economic globalization as a transcendent force breaking down national boundaries, merging national economies into a single global whole, and rapidly eroding the authority and functions of national governments. This view is prevalent among executives of multinational corporations, large NGOs, and comparable organizations operating on a global basis and among individuals with skills, usually of a highly technical nature, for which there is a global demand and who are thus able to pursue careers moving from country to country. The moralistic approach decries patriotism and nationalism as evil forces and argues that international law, institutions, regimes and norms are morally superior to those of individual nations. Commitment to humanity must supersede commitment to nation. This view is found among intellectuals, academics and journalists. Economic transnationalism is rooted in the bourgeoisie, moralistic transnationalism in the intelligentsia.

In 1953, the head of General Motors, nominated to be secretary of defense, proclaimed, "What's good for General Motors is good for America." He was widely criticized for not saying that what's good for America is good for General Motors. Either way, both he and his critics presumed some coincidence of interest between corporation and country. Now, however, multinational corporations see their interests as separate from America's interests. As their global operations expand, corporations founded and headquartered in the United States gradually become less American. In the 1990s, corporations such as Ford, Aetna, Motorola, Price Costco and Kimberly-Clark forcefully rejected, in response to a Ralph Nader proposal, expressions of patriotism and explicitly defined themselves as multinational. America-based corporations operating globally recruit their workforce and their executives, including their top ones, without regard to nationality. The CIA, one of its officials said in 1999, can no longer count on the cooperation of American corporations as it once was able to do, because the corporations view themselves as multinational and may not think it in their interests to help the U.S. government

Nationalism has proven wrong Karl Marx's concept of a unified international proletariat. Globalization is proving right Adam Smith's observation that while "the proprietor of land is necessarily a citizen of the particular country in which his estate lies . . . the proprietor of stock is properly a citizen of the world, and is not necessarily attached to any particular country." Smith's 1776 words describe the way contemporary transnational businessmen see themselves. Summarizing their interviews with executives of 23 American multinational corporations and nonprofit organizations, James Davison Hunter and Joshua Yates conclude:

"Surely these elites are cosmopolitans: they travel the world and their field of responsibility is the world. Indeed, they see themselves as 'global citizens.' Again and again, we heard them say that they thought of themselves more as 'citizens of the world' who happen to carry an American passport than as U.S. citizens who happen to work in a global organization. They possess all that is implied in the notion of the cosmopolitan. They are sophisticated, urbane and universalistic in their perspective and ethical commitments."

Together with the "globalizing elites" of other countries, these American executives inhabit a "socio-cultural bubble" apart from the cultures of individual nations and communicate with each other in a social science-y version of English, which Hunter and Yates label "global speak."

The economic globalizers are fixated on the world as an economic unit. As Hunter and Yates report,

"All these globalizing organizations, and not just the multinational corporations, operate in a world defined by 'expanding markets', the need for 'competitive advantage', 'efficiency', 'cost-effectiveness', 'maximizing benefits and minimizing costs', 'niche markets', 'profitability' and 'the bottom line.' They justify this focus on the grounds that they are meeting the need of consumers all over the world. That is their constituency."

"One thing globalization has done", a consultant to Archer Daniels Midland said, "is to transfer the power of governments to the global consumer."2 As the global market replaces the national community, the national citizen gives way to the global consumer.

Economic transnationals are the nucleus of an emerging global superclass. The Global Business Policy Council asserts:

"The rewards of an increasingly integrated global economy have brought forth a new global elite. Labeled 'Davos Men', 'gold-collar workers' or . . . 'cosmocrats', this emerging class is empowered by new notions of global connectedness. It includes academics, international civil servants and executives in global companies, as well as successful high-technology entrepreneurs."

Estimated to number about 20 million in 2000, of whom 40 percent were American, this elite is expected to double in size by 2010.3 Comprising fewer than 4 percent of the American people, these transnationalists have little need for national loyalty, view national boundaries as obstacles that thankfully are vanishing, and see national governments as residues from the past whose only useful function is to facilitate the elite's global operations. In the coming years, one corporation executive confidently predicted, "the only people who will care about national boundaries are politicians."

Involvement in transnational institutions, networks and activities not only defines the global elite but also is critical to achieving elite status within nations. Someone whose loyalties, identities and involvements are purely national is less likely to rise to the top in business, academia, the media and the professions than someone who transcends these limits. Outside politics, those who stay home stay behind. Those who move ahead think and act internationally. As sociologist Manuel Castells has said, "Elites are cosmopolitan, people are local." The opportunity to join this transnational world, however, is limited to a small minority of people in industrialized countries and to only a miniscule handful of people in developing countries.

The global involvements of the transnational economic elites erode their sense of belonging to a national community. An early 1980s poll showed:

"The higher people's income and education . . . the more conditional the allegiance. . . . They were more likely than the poor and uneducated to say they would leave the country if they could double their income."

In the early 1990s, future Secretary of Labor Robert Reich reached a similar conclusion, noting that "America's highest income earners . . . have been seceding from the rest of the nation."5 This seceding elite is, as John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge say,

"increasingly cut off from the rest of society: Its members study in foreign universities, spend a period of time working abroad and work for organizations that have a global reach. They constitute a world within a world, linked to each other by myriad global networks but insulated from the more hidebound members of their own societies. . . . They are more likely to spend their time chatting with their peers around the world--via phone or e-mail--than talking with their neighbors in the projects around the corner."

Contemporary intellectuals have reinforced these trends. They abandon their commitment to their nation and their fellow citizens and argue the moral superiority of identifying with humanity at large. This proclivity florished in the academic world in the 1990s. The University of Chicago's Martha Nussbaum denounced emphasis on "patriotic pride" as "morally dangerous", urged the ethical superiority of cosmopolitanism over patriotism, and argued that people should direct their "allegiance" to the "worldwide community of human beings." Amy Gutmann of Princeton argues that it was "repugnant" for American students to learn that they are, "above all, citizens of the United States." The "primary allegiance" of Americans, she wrote, "should not be to the United States or to some other politically sovereign community", but to "democratic humanism." George Lipsitz of the University of California, San Diego, argued that "in recent years refuge in patriotism has been the first resort of scoundrels of all sorts." Richard Sennett of NYU denounced "the evil of a shared national identity" and judged the erosion of national sovereignty "basically a positive phenomenon." Peter Spiro of Hofstra University approvingly concluded that it is "increasingly difficult to use the word 'we' in the context of international affairs." In the past people used the word "we" with reference to the nation-state, but now affiliation with the nation-state "no longer necessarily defines the interests or even allegiances of the individual at the international level."

Moralist transnationals reject or are highly critical of the concept of national sovereignty. They agree with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that national sovereignty ought to give way to "individual sovereignty" so that the international community can act to prevent or stop gross violations by governments of the rights of their citizens. This principle provides a basis for the United Nations to intervene militarily or otherwise in the domestic affairs of states, a practice explicitly prohibited by the UN Charter. More generally, the moralists advocate the supremacy of international law over national law, the greater legitimacy of decisions made through international rather than national processes, and the expansion of the powers of international institutions compared to those of national governments. Moralist international lawyers have developed the concept of "customary international law", which holds that norms and practices that have wide acceptance can be a basis for invalidating national laws.

A key step making this principle a reality in America was the 1980 decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals interpreting a 1789 statute designed to protect American ambassadors. In this case, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the court held that Paraguayan citizens residing in the United States could bring civil action in American courts against a Paraguayan government official whom they accused of murdering a Paraguayan in Paraguay. This ruling led to a number of similar cases being filed in U.S. courts. In these cases, courts in one country transcend the territorial jurisdiction of their country and assert the authority to act on alleged human rights abuses by foreigners against foreigners in foreign countries.

Moralist international lawyers argue that precedents in customary international law supersede previous federal and state laws. Since customary international law is not set forth in either statutes or treaties, it is, as the noted legal scholar Jeremy Rabkin says, whatever experts persuade

"a judge to think it may be. For that reason, it is likely to reach more and more deeply into domestic affairs. If a norm in customary international law exists against race discrimination, why not also against sex discrimination? And then why not also against discrimination on the basis of citizenship or language or sexual orientation?"

Moralist international lawyers argue American law must meet international standards and approve of unelected foreign judges, as well as American ones, defining the civil rights of Americans in terms of international rather than American norms. In general, moralist transnationals believe that the United States should support the creation of tribunals such as the International Criminal Court and abide by its decisions as well as those of the International Court of Justice, the UN General Assembly and comparable bodies.

The prevalence of anti-patriotic attitudes among liberal intellectuals led some of them to warn their fellow liberals of the consequences of such attitudes for the future not of America but of American liberalism. Most Americans, as the American public philosopher Richard Rorty has written, take pride in their country, but "many of the exceptions to this rule are found in colleges and universities, in the academic departments that have become sanctuaries for left-wing political views." These leftists have done "a great deal of good for . . . women, African-Americans, gay men and lesbians. . . . But there is a problem with this Left: it is unpatriotic." It "repudiates the idea of a national identity and the emotion of national pride." If the Left is to retain influence, it must recognize that a "sense of shared national identity . . . is an absolutely essential component of citizenship." Without patriotism, the Left will be unable to achieve its goals for America.9 Liberals, in short, must use patriotism as a means to achieve liberal goals.

The Patriotic Public

While elements of America's business and intellectual elites are identifying more with the world as a whole and defining themselves as "global citizens", Americans as a whole are becoming more committed to their nation. Huge majorities of Americans claim to be patriotic and express great pride in their country. Asked in 1991, "How proud are you to be an American?", 96 percent of Americans said "very proud" or "quite proud." The terrorist attacks of 9/11 could not and did not have much effect on these high levels of patriotic assertion; in September 2002, 91 percent of Americans were "extremely" or "very" proud to be American.10

These affirmations of patriotism and pride in country might be less meaningful if people in other countries responded similarly. By and large, they do not. Americans have consistently and overwhelmingly been foremost among peoples in their patriotism and their identification with their country. This country ranked first in national pride among the 41 to 65 countries covered in each of the World Values Surveys of 1981–82, 1990–91, and 1995–96, with 96 to 98 percent of Americans saying they were "very proud" or "quite proud" of their country.

The extent of their identification varies, however, with their socio-economic status, race and place of birth. In the 1990–91 World Values Survey, over 98 percent of native-born Americans, immigrants, non-Hispanic whites, blacks and 95 percent of Hispanics said they were very proud or quite proud of their country. When asked about the priority of their national identity, however, differences appeared. Thirty-one percent of the native-born and of non-Hispanic whites said they identified primarily with America, but these proportions dropped to 25 percent for blacks, 19 percent for Hispanics and 17 percent for immigrants. Asked whether they would be willing to fight for America, 81 percent of non-Hispanic whites and 79 percent of native-born Americans said yes, compared to 75 percent of immigrants, 67 percent of blacks and 52 percent of Hispanics.11[Identity politics is a corrosive factor in our political life]

As these figures suggest, recent immigrants and the descendants of people coerced into becoming part of American society are likely to have more ambivalent attitudes toward that society than the descendants of settlers and earlier immigrants. Blacks and other minorities have fought valiantly in America's wars. Yet significantly fewer blacks than whites think of themselves as patriotic. In a 1989 poll 95 percent of whites and 72 percent of blacks said that they considered themselves "very" or "somewhat" patriotic.12 In a 1998 survey of the parents of school children, 91 percent of white, 92 percent of Hispanic and 91 percent of immigrant parents strongly or somewhat agreed with the statement, "The U.S. is a better country than most other countries in the world." Among African-American parents, the proportion dropped to 84 percent. In other surveys, black-white differences have been somewhat less, yet in a September 2002 Gallup poll for ABC News-Washington Post, 74 percent of whites and 53 percent of non-whites said they were "extremely" proud to be an American, a larger difference than between other major social-economic categories.

Overall, however, with only minor variations, Americans overwhelmingly and intensely identify with their country, particularly compared to other peoples. While American elites may be denationalizing, Americans, the conductors of one comparative survey fittingly concluded, remain "the world's most patriotic people."

Unrepresentative Democracy

Growing differences between the leaders of major institutions and the public on domestic and foreign policy issues affecting national identity form a major cultural fault line cutting across class, denominational, racial, regional and ethnic distinctions. In a variety of ways, the American establishment, governmental and private, has become increasingly divorced from the American people. Politically, America remains a democracy because key public officials are selected through free and fair elections. In many respects, however, it has become an unrepresentative democracy because on crucial issues--especially those involving national identity--its leaders pass laws and implement policies contrary to the views of the American people. Concomitantly, the American people have become increasingly alienated from politics and government.

Apart from business and the military, contemporary American elites in categories such as the media, labor, religion, law and bureaucracy were almost twice to more than three times as liberal as the public as a whole, according to a 1980s survey. Another survey similarly found that on moral issues elites are "consistently more liberal" than rank-and-file Americans.14 Governmental, nonprofit and communications elites in particular are overwhelmingly liberal in their outlooks. So also are academics. The radical students of the 1960s have become tenured professors, particularly in elite institutions. As Stanley Rothman observes, "Social science faculties at elite universities are overwhelmingly liberal and cosmopolitan or on the Left. Almost any form of civic loyalty or patriotism is considered reactionary."15 Liberalism tends to go with irreligiosity as well. In a 1969 study by Lipset and Ladd, at least 71 percent of Jewish, Catholic and Protestant academics who identified themselves as liberal also identified themselves as being "basically opposed to religion."

These differences in ideology, nationalism and religion generate differences on domestic and foreign policy issues related to national identity. The public is overwhelmingly concerned with the protection of military security, societal security, the domestic economy and sovereignty. Foreign policy elites are less concerned with these issues and more concerned with U.S. promotion of international security, peace, globalization and the economic development of foreign nations than is the public. There is, as Jack Citrin concludes, a "gulf between elite advocacy of multiculturalism and stubborn mass support of assimilation to a common national identity."

 The parallel gap between the nationalist public and cosmopolitan elites has its most dramatic impact on the relation between American identity and foreign policy. A 1994 study by Citrin and others concluded that

"the dwindling of consensus about America's international role follows from the waning of agreement on what it means to be an American, on the very character of American nationalism. The domestic underpinnings for the long post-World War II hegemony of cosmopolitan liberalism and internationalism have frayed, quite apart from the fact that the United States no longer confronts a powerful military adversary."

The public and elites agree on many foreign policy issues. Yet overall the differences between them far exceed the similarities. The public is nationalist, elites transnationalist. In 1998, for instance, differences from 22 to 42 percent existed between the views of the public and those of a representative group of foreign policy leaders on 34 major foreign policy issues. In six polls from 1978 to 1998, the proportion of foreign policy elites favoring an active U.S. role in the world never dropped below 96 percent; the proportion of the public favoring such a role never rose above 65 percent. With a few exceptions, the public consistently has been much more reluctant than the leaders to use U.S. military force to defend other countries against invasion. On the other hand, the public is more concerned with upheavals closer to home, willing to support an indigenous uprising against Fidel Castro's regime and to use force in Mexico if it were threatened by revolution. A substantial majority of citizens also believe, however, that the United States should not act alone in international crises without support from its allies, as compared to less than half of elites saying it should not do so. Fifty-seven percent of the public have also approved of America taking part "in UN international peacekeeping forces in troubled parts of the world."

The gap between public and elite is especially great on America's economic relations with the rest of the world. In 1998, 87 percent of leaders and 54 percent of the public thought economic globalization was mostly good for America, with 12 percent of the leaders and 35 percent of the public thinking otherwise. Four-fifths of the public but less than half of foreign policy leaders think protecting American jobs should be a "very important goal" of the U.S. government. Fifty percent or more of the public but never more than a third of leaders have supported reducing economic aid to other countries. In various polls, 60 percent or more of the public have backed tariffs; comparable proportions of leaders have favored reducing or eliminating them. Similar differences exist with respect to immigration. In two 1990s polls, 74 percent and 57 percent of the public and 31 percent and 18 percent of foreign policy elites thought large numbers of immigrants were a "critical threat" to the United States.

These and other differences between elites and the public have produced a growing gap between the preferences of the public and policies embodied in federal legislation and regulation. One study of whether changes in public opinion on a wide range of issues were followed by comparable changes in public policy showed a steady decline from the 1970s when there was a 75 percent congruence between public opinion and government policy to 67 percent in 1984–87, 40 percent in 1989–92, and 37 percent in 1993–94. "The evidence, overall", the authors of this study concluded, "points to a persistent pattern since 1980: a generally low and at times declining level of responsiveness to public opinion especially during the first two years of the Clinton presidency." Hence, they said, there is no basis for thinking that Clinton or other political leaders were "pandering to the public." "A disturbing gap is growing", one analyst concluded, "between what ordinary Americans believe is the proper role of the United States in world affairs and the views of leaders responsible for making foreign policy." Governmental policy at the end of the 20th century was deviating more and more from the preferences of the American public.

The failure of political leaders to "pander" to the public had predictable consequences. When government policies on many important issues deviate sharply from the views of the public, one would expect the public to lose trust in government, to reduce its interest and participation in politics,and to turn to alternative means of policymaking not controlled by political elites. All three happened in the late 20th century. All three undoubtedly had many causes, which social scientists have explored at length, and one trend--decline in trust--occurred in most industrialized democracies. Yet at least for the United States, it can be assumed that the growing gap between public preferences and government policies contributed to all three trends.

First, public confidence in and trust in government and the major private institutions of American society declined dramatically from the 1960s to the 1990s. As three distinguished scholars have pointed out, on every question asked concerning confidence in their government, roughly two thirds of the public expressed confidence in the 1960s and only about one third in the 1990s. In April 1966, for instance,

"with the Vietnam War raging and race riots in Cleveland, Chicago and Atlanta, 66 percent of Americans rejected the view that 'the people running the country don't really care what happens to you.' In December 1997, in the midst of the longest period of peace and prosperity in more than two generations, 57 percent of Americans endorsed the same view."

Similar declines occurred during these decades in the degree which the public had confidence in major public and private institutions. Only two non-elected institutions of government, the Supreme Court and the military, saw an increase in the public's confidence.

Second, as many studies have shown, public participation in and interest in the major governmental and private institutions of American society declined fairly consistently from the 1960s to the 1990s. Sixty-three percent of the adult population voted in 1960, but only 49 percent in 1996 and 51 percent in 2000. In addition, as Thomas Patterson observes,

"Since 1960, participation has declined in virtually every area of election activity, from the volunteers who work on campaigns to the viewers who watch televised debates. The United States had 100 million fewer people in 1960 than it did in 2000 but, even so, more viewers tuned in to the October presidential debates in 1960 than did so in 2000."

In the 1970s, one in three taxpayers allocated a dollar from their tax payments to the fund created by Congress to support political campaigns. In 2000, one in eight did so.

The third consequence of the gap between leaders and the public was the dramatic proliferation of initiatives on major policy issues, including those relating to national identity. Initiatives had been an instrument of progressive reform before World War I. Their use then declined steadily from fifty per two-year election cycle to twenty in the early 1970s. As legislatures neglected the concerns of their constituents, initiatives dramatically became popular again, beginning in June 1978, when 65 percent of California voters approved Proposition 13, drastically limiting taxes, despite the opposition of virtually all the state's political, business and media establishment. This started a tripling of initiatives to an average of 61 per two-year election cycle from the late 1970s to 1998. Fifty-five initiatives were voted on in 1998, 69 in 2000 and 49 in 2002. Between 1980 and 2002, there were 14 initiative votes in six states on issues concerning American national identity: six opposing bilingualism, six endorsing the use of English or declaring English the state's official language, and two opposing racial preferences. In all of these hotly debated contests, the state political, governmental, academic, media, religious, professional and business elites overwhelmingly opposed the initiative. In all these contests but one, the public approved the initiatives by margins avering 63 percent and going up to 85 percent. David S. Broder concluded in Democracy Derailed that "the trust between governors and governed on which representative government depends has been badly depleted."[But it seems the RATS deliberately undercut any conservative government regardless of consequences to the nation at large]

In today's America, a major gap exists between the nation's elites and the general public over the salience of national identity compared to other identities and over the appropriate role for America in the world. Substantial elite elements are increasingly divorced from their country, and the American public, in turn, is increasingly disillusioned with its government.

America in the World

How both America's elites and the rank-and-file define their country determines its role in the world, but how the world views that role also shapes American identity. Three broad concepts exist of America in relation to the rest of the world. Americans can embrace the world--that is, open their country to other peoples and cultures. They can try to reshape other societies in terms of American values and culture. They can strive to maintain their society and culture distinct from those of other peoples.

The first, or cosmopolitan, alternative involves a renewal of the trends dominating pre-September 11 America. America welcomes the world, its ideas, its goods and, most importantly, its people. The ideal would be an open society with open borders, encouraging subnational ethnic, racial and cultural identities, dual citizenship, diasporas, and would be led by elites who increasingly identified with global institutions, norms and rules rather than national ones. America should be multiethnic, multiracial, multicultural.

 Diversity is a prime value, if not the prime value. The more people who bring to America different languages, religions and customs, the more American America becomes. Middle-class Americans would identify increasingly with the global corporations for which they work rather than with the local communities in which they live. The activities of Americans would more and more be governed not by the federal and state governments, but by rules set by international authorities, such as the UN, the WTO, customary international law, and global treaties. National identity loses salience compared to other identities. In this cosmopolitan alternative, the world reshapes America.

In the imperial alternative, America reshapes the world.The end of the Cold War eliminated communism as the overriding factor shaping America's role in the world. It thus enabled liberals to pursue their foreign policy goals without having to confront the charge that those goals compromised national security and hence to promote "nation building", "humanitarian intervention" and "foreign policy as social work." The emergence of the United States as the world's only superpower had a parallel impact on American conservatives. During the Cold War America's enemies denounced it as an imperial power. At the start of the new millennium conservatives accepted and endorsed the idea of an American empire--whether they embraced the term or not--and the use of American power to reshape the world according to American values.

The imperial impulse was thus fueled by beliefs in the supremacy of American power and the universality of American values. Because America's power far exceeds that of other nations, America has the responsibility to create order and confront evil throughout the world. According to the universalist belief, the people of other societies have basically the same values as Americans, or if they do not have them, they want to have them, or if they do not want to have them, they misjudge what is good for their society, and Americans have the responsibility to persuade them or to induce them to embrace the universal values that America espouses. In such a world America loses its identity as a nation and becomes the dominant component of a supranational empire.

Neither the supremacy assumption nor the universalist assumption, however, accurately reflects the state of the early 21st-century world. America is the only superpower, but there are other major powers: Britain, Germany, France, Russia, China, India and Japan at a global level, and Brazil, Nigeria, Iran, South Africa and Indonesia within their regions. America cannot achieve any significant goal in the world without the cooperation of at least some of these countries. The culture, values, traditions and institutions of the other societies are often not compatible with reconfiguring those societies in terms of American values. Their peoples generally also feel deeply committed to their indigenous ways of life and beliefs and hence fiercely resist efforts to change them by outsiders from alien cultures. In addition, whatever the goals of their elites, the American public has consistently ranked the promotion of democracy abroad as a low-priority goal. The introduction of democracy in other societies also often stimulates anti-American forces, such as populist movements in Latin American states and violent, extremist movements in Muslim countries.

Cosmopolitanism and imperialism attempt to reduce or to eliminate the social, political and cultural differences between America and other societies.A national approach would recognize and accept what distinguishes America from those societies. America cannot become the world and still be America.Other peoples cannot become American and still be themselves. America is different, and that difference is defined in large part by its religious commitment and Anglo-Protestant culture. The alternative to cosmopolitanism and imperialism is nationalism devoted to the preservation and enhancement of those qualities that have defined America from its inception.

For almost four centuries, the Anglo-Protestant culture of the founding settlers has been the central and the lasting component of American identity. One has only to ask: Would America be the America it is today if in the 17th and 18th centuries it had been settled not by British Protestants but by French, Spanish, or Portuguese Catholics? The answer is no. It would not be America; it would be Quebec, Mexico, or Brazil.

America's Anglo-Protestant culture has combined political and social institutions and practices inherited from England, including most notably the English language, together with the concepts and values of dissenting Protestantism, which faded in England but which the settlers brought with them and which took on new life on the new continent. At the beginning, as Alden T. Vaughan has said,

"almost everything was fundamentally English: the forms of land ownership and cultivation, the system of government and the basic format of laws and legal procedures, the choices of entertainment and leisure-time pursuits, and innumerable other aspects of colonial life."

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., concurs: "the language of the new nation, its laws, its institutions, its political ideas, its literature, its customs, its precepts, its prayers, primarily derived from Britain."

With adaptations and modifications, this original culture persisted for three hundred years. Two hundred years after John Jay in 1789 identified six central elements Americans had in common, one of these, common ancestry, no longer existed. Several of the five others--language, religion, principles of government, manners and customs, war experience--had been modified or diluted. Yet in their fundamentals Jay's components of American identity, although challenged, still defined American culture in the 20th century. Protestantism has been of primary and continuing importance. With respect to language, the efforts of 18th-century German settlers in Pennsylvania to make German the equal of English infuriated Benjamin Franklin, among others, and did not succeed.

At least until the appearance of bilingualism and large concentrations of Spanish-speaking immigrants in Miami and the Southwest, America was unique as a huge country of more than 200 million people virtually all speaking the same language.

During the 19th century and until the late 20th century, immigrants were in various ways compelled, induced, and persuaded to adhere to the central elements of the Anglo-Protestant culture. Contemporary cultural pluralists, multiculturalists, and spokesmen for ethnic and racial minorities testify to the success of these efforts. Southern and Eastern European immigrants, Michael Novak poignantly commented in 1977, were pressured to become "American" by adapting to Anglo-American culture: Americanization "was a process of vast psychic repression." In similar language, Will Kymlicka in 1995 argued that prior to the 1960s, immigrants "were expected to shed their distinctive heritage and assimilate entirely to existing cultural norms", which he labeled the "Anglo-conformity model."

These critics are right. Throughout American history, people who were not white Anglo-Saxon Protestants have become Americans by adopting its Anglo-Protestant culture and political values. This benefited them and the country.

Millions of immigrants and their children achieved wealth, power and status in American society precisely because they assimilated themselves into the prevailing American culture.Hence there is no validity to the claim that Americans have to choose between a white, racist, WASP-ish ethnic identity, on the one hand, and an abstract, shallow civic identity dependent on commitment to certain political principles, on the other. The core of their identity is the culture that the settlers created, which generations of immigrants have absorbed, and which gave birth to the American Creed. At the heart of that culture has been Protestantism.

Religiosity distinguishes America from most other Western societies. Americans are also overwhelmingly Christian, which distinguishes them from many non-Western peoples. Their religiosity leads Americans to see the world in terms of good and evil to a much greater extent than most other peoples. The leaders of other societies often find this religiosity not only extraordinary but also exasperating for the deep moralism it engenders in the consideration of political, economic and social issues.

Religion and nationalism have gone hand in hand in the history of the West. As the historian Adrian Hastings has shown, the former often defined the content of the latter: "Every ethnicity is shaped significantly by religion just as it is by language. . . . [In Europe,] Christianity has shaped national formation."25 The connection between religion and nationalism was alive and well at the end of the 20th century. Those countries that are more religious tend to be more nationalist. A survey of 41 countries found that those societies in which more people gave a "high" rating to the importance of God in their life were also those in which more people were "very proud" of their country.26

Within countries, individuals who are more religious also tend to be more nationalist. A 1983 survey of 15, mostly European, countries found that "in every country surveyed, those who said they were not religious are less likely to be proud of their country." On average, the difference is 11 percent. Most European peoples rank low in their belief in God and their pride in country. America ranks with Ireland and Poland, close to the top on both dimensions. Catholicism is essential to Irish and Polish national identity. The dissenting Protestant heritage is central to America's. Americans are overwhelmingly committed to both God and country and see them as inseparable. In a world in which religion shapes the allegiances, the alliances and the antagonisms of people on every continent, it should not be surprising if Americans again turn to religion to find their national identity and their national purpose.[Perhaps why "The Passion of The Christ was so controversial for some,]

Significant elements of American elites are favorably disposed to America becoming a cosmopolitan society. Other elites wish it to assume an imperial role. The overwhelming bulk of the American people are committed to a national alternative and to preserving and strengthening the American identity of centuries.

America becomes the world. The world becomes America. America remains America. Cosmopolitan? Imperial? National? The choices Americans make will shape their future as a nation and the future of the world.